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RELIGION MISUSED BY SERBS AND CROATS 
 
By Maja Torlo 
 
 
Maja Torlo was born in 1994 in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She studied at the United World 
College in Mostar, where she conducted her extended essay on the breakdown of former Yugoslavia. She 
is a student at the Lake Forest College in Lake Forest, Illinois, but is currently studying abroad at 
AMIDEAST in Amman, Jordan. Maja is interested in studying developing countries in terms of conflict, 
peace-making and economic development. 
 
Abstract: 
 This research concentrates on the Christian and Orthodox religion among the Serbs and 
Croats in former Yugoslavia and how it contributed to the outbreak of the Serbo-Croat war in 
1992. This is done by assessing the main ways in which religion was abused and twisted to raise 
anger, fear, and enmity between Croats and Serbs by both nationalistic leaders and Church 
leaders in the period from the communist rule to the outbreak in 1992. Therefore, first, the 
following things are assessed: the consequences of (1) identification and grouping of people 
along religious and ethnic lines, (2) mass religious events, which estranged the nations, (3) 
minimization of the cultural similarities through striving to present each nation as fundamentally 
different and, to an extent, (4) the failure of ecumenical dialogue under communism. 
Furthermore, the contribution of the enforcement of homogenous identity and the fusion of 
religion and ethnicity into one is determined, allowing for a better understanding of the actual 
role religion played among the two ethnicities. Crucial for understanding the course of events is 
the conveyed characteristic that ethnicity and religion were so deeply interlaced that it was 
almost impossible to determine where one began and the other ended. And finally, the last and 
crucial phase during the disintegration of Yugoslavia is analyzed, as it is where nationalistic 
leaders worked hard to gain dominance among their people and turn one ethnicity against the 




Ethno-religious1 conflicts have dominated the modern world, especially in the post-Cold 
War period. Yugoslavia was a crossroad of the Orthodox Byzantine East, the Roman Catholic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ethno-religious conflict is a situation where groups of different religious and ethnic background engage 
in conflict due to fear, suspision, lack of trust etc. 
http://www.academicjournals.org/ingoj/pdf/pdf2011/Oct/Fawole%20and%20Bello.pdf accessed on 
6/10/2012 13:10 
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West, and the Islamic Southeast.  Its nations, among which the most prominent were Croats and 
Serbs, first lived under foreigners and then united into a system that was dominated by Serbs and 
renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. During World War Two, the state was infiltrated and torn apart by 
Nazis and their puppet state2 with Ante Pavelić as the leader. Widespread massacres, especially 
of Serbs, Jews, and Roma (Gypsies) were committed across Yugoslavia. Ustaše3 were engraved 
into the memories of the Serb due to the forcible conversion and widespread killings they 
committed. Under Josip Broz-Tito’s control, partisans4 liberated the country from the Nazis and 
then created the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia with a communist regime in control. Tito 
suppressed nationalistic tendencies and animosities between the people during his reign. The 
idea of “brotherhood and unity” became the cultural religion5 that connected Yugoslavs. But the 
idea of Yugoslavia was damaged. Their religious leaders, mainly heads of Churches and 
religious writers, rallied the people around their respective Churches. The difference between 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, which was minimized during the secular period under Yugoslavia, 
started to be emphasized. Religion started to represent the synonym of ethnicity; they became too 
intertwined, which was crucial for the outcome in 1992. Thus, the reconciliation that was 
attempted under communism began to fade, and nationalistic and ethnic rhetoric took the lead. 
After Tito’s death, fear and suspicion, intensified by religious leaders and nationalistic 
politicians, lead to one ethnicity seeking domination while the other sought independence. As 
memories of violence and animosity between people were re-invoked and manipulated by 
nationalistic and religious leaders, one side accused the other for the atrocities of the past and of 
planning new ones, and the situation escalated into the Serbo-Croat war of 1992. Thus in the 
following sections this paper will discuss to what extent Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, 
used in the ways mentioned above, caused the outbreak of the Serbo-Croat war. 
 
Period Under Communism and the Deterioration of Church Relations 
Under communism certain important events took place which hindered the stability of the 
regime: grouping of people around religion and ethnicity, mass religious events which estranged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Independent nation of Croatia 
3 Label for the Croatians who sided with Hitler 
4 The communist-led resistance fighters, a.k.a the National Liberation Army 
5 It became the erzats- religion of the whole Yugoslav culture, the civil religion of all the Yugoslav people 
regardless of ethnicity. 
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the nations, and minimization of the cultural similarities through striving to present each nation 
as fundamentally different. 
While Tito was alive, a period of semi-peace enveloped Yugoslavia as unresolved issues 
between the regime and the churches, and between churches themselves, were still present. 
Through their history, these churches, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Catholic 
Church of Croats (CCC), have always been ultimate guides of their believers. Convinced it was 
their duty, they often parted from the realm of the sacred and engaged in politics. Crucial for 
understanding the course of events was the fact that ethnicity and religion were so deeply 
interlaced that it was impossible to separate them. However, under communism, the Churches 
were deprived of political activity. The cultural religions of Catholicism and Orthodoxy were 
substituted by ‘’Brotherhood and Unity’’.  
In the 1960s, Vatican together with figures such as Vjekoslav Bajsić and Tomislav Šagi-
Bunić attempted to reintroduce the ecumenical reconciliation between SOC and CCC. However, 
the request by SOC for a public apology for the Ustaša killings of Serbs received a cool response 
and reconciliation deteriorated. The League of Communists of Serbia, at a session in 1972, 
accused SOC of being “distrustful and unreceptive toward reforms of the Second Vatican 
Council in the Catholic Church” and of “opening the explosive issue of the Second World War 
massacres at Jasenovac and other Ustaša crimes while making no reference to Četnik Crimes”6. 
Thus, as reconciliation between churches faded, in several settings in the 1980s both 
churches strained relations between Serbs and Croats awaking nationalism by enforcing 
homogenous identity,7 or identities based on common origin, culture, and beliefs of nations along 
ethnic and religious lines. Rallying points used were the historical myths, symbols, places of 
worship (sacred spaces each nation honored and wanted to protect) making it possible to abuse 
the feelings and fears of people. Thus, in the early 1980s, Churches staged massive pilgrimages 
with which they “sought to flex muscles, deliver a message to enemies, encourage the faithful, 
revitalize the faith, and mobilize believers in response to crisis and challenge.”8 The Great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., p. 54. 
7 Homogenous idenitites meaning identites which are shared by people of common 
origin/ethnicity/religion: purely Croat Catholic idenities or purely Serb Orthodox identities. 8	  Vjekoslav Perica,  Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States  (New York: Oxford 
University Press,  2002), p. 67.	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Novena of 19799 (prayer gathering) served such a purpose for the CCC. At that gathering a 
speech held by Cardinal Franjo Kuharić took overtones of nationalistic rhetoric: referring to the 
Serb Church, its creation was portrayed as a misfortune that occurred due to St. Sava's deceit of 
Serbs. Serbs while under Ottomans were accused of jealousy toward the more free Catholics, 
which the vehement aggression against Stepinac by Serbs helped by enforcing the adoration of 
Stepinac among Catholics.10 Stepinac was simultaneously a national figure who resisted Nazis, 
defending the Serbs against Ustaša and their violence, and, for Croats, a martyr who, because he 
refused to betray Rome, was imprisoned and oppressed under communists. These speeches, 
tarnished with nationalism, drew great support from audiences, giving them a sense of belonging, 
reviving national emotions, and showing them who their enemies were: those attacking their 
saints, nation, and heritage. Franić finished the ceremony by reinforcing the idea of SOC as the 
Byzantine invader: “God rendered to us Catholic Croats this land in which we have lived for a 
thousand and three hundred years, and we will not let anyone else rule over us in our own 
land.”11 CCC, by rushing to defend and reinserting itself into the center of Croatian nation, 
contributed to national awakening, but also to the revival of nationalism. 
Concurrently, Serbs held their greatest jubilee: 800th anniversary of birth of St.Sava. As 
with the Novena, it served to mark SOC as the last stronghold-enforcer of nationalism. The topic 
of Ustaše was again played onto, raising nationalistic feelings, and the determination of the 
people never to allow it again, while Četniks were not mentioned. It invoked pride and 
nationalism with myths such as the Kosovo myth (valorous Serbian defeat by Turks) aiming at 
reviving the great “Serbdom” and persuading people that Serbia was facing disintegration which 
needed to be stopped by the unification of Serbs; voicing the alleged violence against Serbs by 
Croatians and Albanians.12 The SOC strongly and effectively presented itself as the sole political 
and spiritual leader. These gatherings invoked ethno-religious violence through abuse of religion 
and myths. As both nationalistic revivals were occurring almost simultaneously, a battle of 
churches had already begun in the 1960-70s. 
Due to conflicts between Churches, from then on a need arose to differentiate one nation 
from the other as much as possible, which further alienated the ethnicities and deteriorated their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.,	   pp. 65-69.	  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. p. 70. 
12 Ibid. pp. 50-56. 
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relationship in the 1980s. “Identity is built on difference, and when differences become too 
small, identity becomes threatened,“13 especially in Yugoslavia, as Serbs and Croats shared a 
common language, the Serbo-Croatian. Thus, groups sought ways of distancing themselves from 
the other, finding shelter among their own. The national origin, which always included religion, 
was a crucial component of identity and culture. It was necessary to present it as completely 
different from the other—in short, to present it as the glue of the nation. Thus, different 
historiographies were written in Yugoslavia: histories that were subjective and nationalistic and, 
crucially, encouraged, accepted, and aided by Churches. Debates between historians from both 
sides began, each contesting to glorify its own version and disgrace the other. The Serbians 
portrayed the decision of the Croats to side with Rome after the Great Schism as a selfish 
decision by Croat kings for personal gain. Croatians on the other hand talked of Serbs as tricked 
into choosing to stay with Constantinople and Orthodoxy. Furthermore, Serbs argued that Croats 
and Serbs were one before the Schism. At the Great Novena, such statement was vehemently 
protested. Instead it was asserted that Croatians and Serbs were ethnically different people and 
should have independent states. Further aggressive and emotional debates on very explosive 
topics of the Ustaše and Četnik killings, and also the Croatian oppression by Serbs during the 
first Yugoslavia, were elaborated on. Understandably, such sensitive topics had the great effect 
of propaganda, stirring animosity and hatred, and also fear of such tragic events reoccurring. An 
urge to prevent that increased, but even before Tito died animosities had greatly risen. Rhetoric 
with nationalistic overtones was not only used by nationalists themselves, but first by anti-
communists and clergy. With that, possibility of reconciliation seemed increasingly bleak.  
 
Death of Tito and the Beginning of the End 
Tito died on  May 4, 1980--a grievance for all. The deterioration of the economy, which 
had already started under Tito, now reached troubling dimensions and gave a gloomy outlook, 
making it easier for people to be manipulated against each other. Combined with numerous 
transitions, the survival of the communist regime became inevitable. Scandals and corruptions, 
seen as causes of economic decline, invalidated the regime. Accusations between the ethnicities 
of Yugoslavia began; each was convinced that others had caused the problems. Seeing that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Torsten Kolind, Post-war Identification: Everyday Muslim Counterdiscourse in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
(Oakville, CT: Aarhus University Press, 2008), p. 39. 
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Communist Party was discredited, the elites turned to the nationalistic, ethno-religious rhetoric 
as means of gaining support and undermining rival ethnicities. Churches followed a similar 
course; they found nationalism to be a very efficient tool for gaining legitimacy and influence. 
The revival of religion, at the price of desecularization, increased the politicization of religion 
and vice-versa. The Serbs and SOC saw an opportunity to gain the dominant position in 
Yugoslavia, the one they had had before, and to form the Great Serbia. Croats, on the other 
hand, believed it could do much better on its own and yearned to join the West, as Croatia was a 
more prosperous state. In such a society of divided aspirations, it was difficult to reach 
agreements, which ultimately spelled ruin for Yugoslavia. In January of 1990, the League of 
Communists met in Belgrade for the last time. The meeting was unproductive. Slovenia and 
Croatia were oriented towards independence, and Serbia for a centralized Yugoslavia. Failing to 
reach an agreement, representatives went back to their republics, gave up on communism, and 
continued politics along religious and nationalist lines rather than political ones.  
Significantly, the inability to find a solution for the problems regarding Yugoslavia 
 was a foreshadowing of its downfall as ethnicity and religion became the favored markers of the 
new cultural identities and provided the social matrix within which political interests were 
defined.14 People found it hard to find their place, or legitimacy for their culture and religion 
inside the Yugoslavian system, and thus became easy targets for the nationalist rhetoric of elites 
and churches.  “Brotherhood and Unity” was replaced with a mind-set of ''us against them:'' 
hatred for those responsible for the past sufferings and losses of each nation. Multi-ethnic society 
ceased to hold credibility and each group chose religious-cultural identification. The Communist 
Party was right when in 1984 it stated:  
If we allow [a] multiparty system in this country, all . . . the people would get 
would be several new ethnic and religious parties without any specific political or 
economic agenda and issues except hatred for one another and their leaders’ cries 
for partitions and secessions…15 
 
Inner-Church Problems and the Intensification of Conflicts between Churches 
These lethal methods of nationalism against the regime, including the intensified conflicts 
between the Churches, only added to the already highly fractious situation. From the 1960’s on, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation. (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000),  p. 57. 
15 Perica,  op.cit., p. 57. 
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even though both churches had recovered significantly, the Serbian Orthodox Church faced 
challenges during the period from 1970s to the 1990s. Already in 1970s it was faced with the 
uprising of Albanians in Kosovo. The clergy publicly lamented the alleged constant violence of 
Albanians against the Serb minority in Kosovo. The SOC responded to Albanian protests with 
propaganda that defined the exodus of Serbs as genocide of Serbs and filled many reports and 
articles with alleged rapes, murders, and destruction of monuments. The Kosovo myth prevented 
any possibility of Serbs giving up their claims to Kosovo. As the Church was constantly 
reminding Serbs of the pride of their nation, the constant struggles and reports of deaths of Serbs, 
it only enhanced their resolved to defend it. Simultaneously, the SOC also faced division of its 
branches such as the Macedonian Orthodox Church which wanted independence and a North 
American branch broke away from the Patriarchate of the SOC. Significantly, the relationships 
between the Churches was frustrated by the Vatican’s behavior. Vatican sympathized with the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church’s aspiration for independence and expressed support for the 
Albanian autonomy through series of radio broadcasts. Though the Pope didn’t support these 
movements to aggravate the SOC, it came across as aiming at exactly that. This can be seen in 
the SOC Patriarch’s statement:  
No other Orthodox Church has accepted the forceful separation of one part of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church from the rest of it. On another side, they (Macedonians) 
are recognized by Vatican! Doesn’t this one detail really tell you enough?16 
  
These two crises widened the void between the SOC and the Catholic Church. The Serbian 
Church found its solutions in invoking the nationalistic feeling among the Serbs as the most 
powerful tool of national and emotional mobilization. It came to be an integral part of the 
Serbian national identity: “The nation is a corporate unity, held together much more by force and 
emotion, than by mind.” 17 
Furthermore, the Serbian frustration was fuelled by representations of Serbian people as 
the greatest martyrs after Jews and drew energy from the interpretation of their history as a series 
of sufferings and injustices. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts accused Croatia of 
persecuting the Serbian minority, which gained support from SOC. And Croatian nationalism 
and anticommunism was fed by the Medjugorje miracles. Visions of the Virgin Mary that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., p. 146. 
17 Reinhold Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics (Westminster: John 
Knox Press, 2002). p. 44. 
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happened there, greatly celebrated and channeled through media, angered the Serbs. They 
experienced it as a slap in the face of the Church and claimed that this was only the celebration 
of Ustaša and their reawakening.  The Serbian newspaper “Pravoslavlje” published a statement 
of Svetozar Dušanić suggesting the division of Yugoslavia into a Byzantine and Roman sphere 
of influence due to tremendous differences between the Croats and Serbs in historical, cultural, 
and religious aspects. He believed it would divert more tragedies, such as the killings during 
World War II.18 This was also a way to frighten Serbs and increase their hatred and suspicions of 
Croats. Furthermore, in 1989 the SOC demanded reparation for the losses at the hand of Ustaša 
from Croatia. Serbian accusations of the mistreatment and murders of Serbs in Croatia were 
labeled by the Croatian government as means of aggravating inter-church and inter-ethnic 
relations.  
As seen through the examples, the reconciliation of the Churches had greatly deteriorated 
by propaganda of the SOC regarding massacres by Ustaša and mistreatment of Serbian minority 
in Croatia, but also by the CCC’s support of Međugorje apparitions without empathy for the 
Serbs.  
But what crucially angered the SOC was the unwillingness of the CCC to apologize for 
killings and its quest for the beatification of the controversial figure of Alojzije Cardinal 
Stepinac. Even though it was a controversial topic, the CCC could have still apologized for all 
involved in the conversion and murder of great numbers of Serbs. The CCC was right in 
protesting against the portrayal of all Croats as killers, but an apology might have greatly 
repaired the relations between the Churches. If the SOC hadn’t persevered with its demand in 
such a strong manner it might have encouraged the Catholics to express their apologies. Instead, 
Croatians tended to minimize casualties while Serbs exaggerated the numbers. This left space for 
nationalists to play on these feelings of anger and fear for their own nationalistic aspirations. 
“Ethnic and religious leaders are key players in defining ‘the people’, a slippery concept difficult 
to control but easy to manipulate.”19  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Perica,  op.cit., p. 158.	  
19 Appleby, op.cit.,  p.58. 
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Multiparty Elections and Rise of Nationalists Backed by Churches  
Sadly, the religious and political leaders from late 80s appealed to religious identities, 
ethnic claims and historical struggles to divide Serbs and Croats (uniting their own) and set the 
ground for conflict. Churches, especially at that time, felt it was their mission to support the 
nationalistic parties which would allegedly defend their people and prevent them from being 
enslaved.  
In the late 80s, political leaders from all sides arose. These included extreme nationalists 
such as Serbian Slobodan Milošević and Croatian Franjo Tuđman. They found that by invoking 
religion they could win the support of the Churches, and thus, of their followers. Presenting 
themselves as champions for the hopes of their nations they won sympathy and support. Clergy 
in Serbia believed that Milošević would lead the Serbian nation out of its suffering and unify 
their territory. The image of Greater Serbia was reawakened. Milošević knew how to play on the 
wounds of memory and anger, such as the Kosovo myth and Ustašas, and connections to 
tradition, history, and ethnicity. The main fear of SOC, which was passed onto the people, was 
disunity, and Milošević was well aware of that.  
On St.Vitus Day, in the conclusion of the 600th celebration of the Kosovo battle, 
Slobodan Milosevic gave a speech in which he conveyed that new battles for 
Serbia shall soon be fought, including armed battles.20  
 
Furthermore, in the pre-election year of 1989 Milošević would be remembered not only by the 
statement “Only Unity Saves Serbs”21, but also for, “nobody will ever beat you [Serbs] again.”22 
His nationalist partner from BiH, Radovan Karadžić, in 1991 at funeral dedicated to fallen 
victims of Ustaše, called Serbs to look at the Church as the unifier of the people and rally around 
it. Milošević’s ultra-nationalistic policies were blindly adopted and justified by his appeal to 
religion.  
The historian (and former Yugoslav Army general) Tuđman, on the Croat side, had 
already built himself an image under Tito when he refused to acknowledge the new (Serbian) 
historiography. He was also a partisan; not Ustaša, but he was nationalistic enough to gain the 
sympathy of the CCC and its full support. With his powerful speeches and strong appearance, he 
made them less afraid of Serbs and Milošević. Seemingly, he would prevent Croatians from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Perica, op.cit., p. 128. 
21 Appleby, op.cit., p. 68.  
22 Robert Thomas,  Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s ( London: C. Hurst and Co. 1999), p. 44. 
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being dominated by Serbs again, and even fulfil the ideal of Greater Croatia by annexing 
“Croatian” parts of BiH when Croatia became independent.  
The sacralized quest for an autonomous polity—for a nation and a state 
corresponding to each ethnic group—inflamed the competition between ethnic 
groups for control of disputed territory played into the hands of extremist 
politicians and religious leaders.23 
 
Thus, in 1990 when multiparty elections were held, the nationalistic leaders backed by churches 
won: Tuđman’s Croatian nationalistic party, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) won by a slight 
margin (thanks to CCC) and Milošević’s party SDS (Socialist Party of Serbia) won in Serbia. In 
Milošević’s case, even though SOC hadn't helped him win directly, a lot of clergy supported him 
and joined his party. The CCC gave unlimited support for the new regime and its aim of 
independence. HDZ became the movement for independence and sovereignty—a reward for the 
loyalty of Catholics. They used nationalistic propaganda in order to rally people around ethnic 
nationalism and both Churches. Seeing the dominating parties as national movements gave them 
monopoly over their states and the freedom to misuse religion and the emotions of the people. 
 
Propaganda: The Last Push 
 At the peak of the friction in the 90s, propaganda through media was used to misuse the 
past and cause violence. Funerals arranged by SOC for victims of the Ustaša genocide or 
celebrations of saints were transmitted by TVs across Serbia. Nationalists and politicians held 
speeches against the other Church. Thus, SOC was a tool of nationalistic propaganda. Similarly, 
at the opening of the Parliament in Croatia, pictures were taken of religious and nationalistic 
leaders conveying the idea of unity of church and nation. Religious newspapers were used for 
politics. Glas koncila, a Croatian newspaper which supported Tuđman published articles 
dedicated to him. Veritas, another Catholic magazine, published a speech in which the author 
clearly showed the relationship of the Church and State: 
The cross of Christ stands next to Croatian flag, Croatian bishop next to Croatian 
minister of state. Present at masses in churches are officers and Croatian soldiers. 
Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks…Thank God it all ended well, due to 
Pope and Croatian politics.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Appleby, op.cit., p. 60. 
24  Quoted in Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New 
York:  Continuum, 1994),  p. 130. 
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Other propaganda served the same purpose. Serbian hierarchs published false reports on 
destruction of monuments and murders/rapes of Serbs to mobilize the Serbs in Croatia and cause 
rebellions instead of pacifying people. Allegedly, the main targets were priests, women, and 
children. They compared Tuđman to Pavelić, and warned people to prepare for genocide. In 
response, Tuđman removed all Serbian cultural expressions from Croatia, a move backed by 
Cardinal Kuharić. Symbols which to Serbs seemed as invocations of Ustaše spread across 
Croatia. This was deadly as Tuđman disregarded the unstable position of Serbs in Croatia created 
by the propaganda.  
Immediately after the free multiparty elections in the Republic of Croatia 1990, 
mistreatment of Croatians by Serbs who went around in vehicles with pictures of the Serbian 
leader and Church symbols was reported. Already by 1991, many clashes had occurred where 
Serbs attacked Croatian Catholic villagers and police units. Large massacres occurred at 
Škabrnja, Kusonje. Thus, Serbo-Croat war erupted in 1992. 
 
Conclusion 
Thus, efforts of Church figures, even though not aiming for a war, resulted in it. In 
creating such merging of religion and ethnicity, and playing on past traumas, wounds, and 
unsurpassed animosity, a situation of cracking tension was created. The failure to find a solution 
for the economic problems and the future of Yugoslavia allowed for the creation of identities 
based on religion and ethnicity. People, amid the economic crisis and the disintegration of the 
regime, were vulnerable to nationalistic rhetoric of Tuđman, Milošević, and the Churches, and 
were placed in a scenario of “us OR them.” The Kosovo crisis and propaganda speeches brought 
Serbs near the edge. But religion did not solely cause the outbreak of the war. The unstable 
climate of Yugoslavia, the gloomy outlook for the future caused by the deteriorating economy, 
the history of conflict between Serbs and Croats, and the propaganda, were all necessary for the 
situation in 1992 to pass into the Serbo-Croat war. Therefore, though a very important cause of 
the war, both a long and short-term one, it only caused the war to the extent of aiding nationalists 
in turning Serbs against Croats and of making people fearful and vengeful so that they would 
turn to the Churches as their guides and reinforce the Churches’ positions. 	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